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Abstract: There is a vigorous debate on the liberalization of heavily regulated agricultural 
markets in India. A crucial institutional characteristic is the role of state regulated brokers in 
wholesale markets. Relying on data from a unique survey in Uttarakhand, a state in North-
India, we find that regulations on margins are ineffective as most brokers charge rates that 
significantly exceed the regulated ones. We also find that a majority of farmers self-select 
into long-term relationships with brokers. These relationships allow some of the farmers to 
interlink credit and insurance markets to the agricultural output market. This interlinkage 
does however not appear to be an instrument for farmer exploitation (as it does not lead to 
worse inputs, high interest rates, or lower implicit output prices), but is seemingly an extra 
service by brokers as to establish farmer loyalty to him and thus to ensure future supplies. 
 
JEL classification: Q12, Q13, L15 
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1. Introduction 
Since the end of the 1990s, India‘s economy has grown by impressive numbers. It is 
generally accepted that growth was triggered and sustained by a series of gradual steps at 
liberalizing India‘s regulated economy. Despite the observed success of liberalization in 
promoting growth, the debate on liberalization versus regulation is far from over, in particular 
when it concerns the more traditional economic sectors in India. One of these is agriculture. 
Government intervention has been pervasive in agricultural markets in India since 
independence in 1947. Until very recently, almost all of India‘s wholesale markets were in 
some way regulated (Acharya, 2004). Regulations included a variety of rules such as a 
licensing system for traders and brokers, the imposition of auctions, the requirement for 
buyers and sellers to go through government-licensed brokers, the size of commission rates, 
mandated weighing charges and costs of loading and unloading, and taxation of each 
transaction. These regulations were imposed decades ago. Their purpose was to improve the 
efficiency of markets and to ensure remunerative prices for producers as well as affordable 
prices for consumers as agricultural marketing was then perceived to be badly organized, 
leading to low prices for the producer, large physical losses, and high marketing costs 
(Mehta, 2006; World Bank, 2007; Acharya, 2004).  
However, current market realities do not meet these objectives. Recent research on the 
traditional marketing system in India concludes that agricultural markets are not efficient 
(Mattoo et al., 2007; Umali-Deininger and Deininger, 2001), lack integration (Palaskas and 
Harriss-White, 1996), are pested by collusion (Banerji and Meenakshi, 2004), and are 
characterized by a high level of wastage (Mattoo et al., 2007). In response to these failures, 
the central government has proposed a set of reforms in 2003 to liberalize the regulated 
system. This has sparked an active debate on the vices and virtues of existing market 
regulations (e.g. Shiva, 2007; Gopalakrishnan and Sreenivasa, 2009). State governments have 
shown mixed reactions. Some have undertaken liberalization, others have continued the 
existing regulations. 
It is now well known that the impact of liberalization of highly regulated food systems 
is crucially dependent on the institutional organization of the regulated system, on external 
conditions, on the nature of the liberalization process – as is well documented by the very 
diverse experiences in agricultural liberalizations in East Asia, compared with those in 
Africa, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (e.g. Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004; 
Swinnen et al., 2011). It is therefore crucial to have a good understanding of the precise 
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empirical functioning of the regulated systems to assess how (various forms of) liberalization 
would affect this. 
Interestingly, despite the vigorous debate on the pros and cons of market regulations 
in India, surprisingly little empirical research has been done recently on the functioning of 
these markets and on the effects of these regulations, as to inform the public debate (notable 
exceptions are e.g. Goyal, 2010; Banerji and Meenakshi, 2004, 2008). This paper aims to 
contribute to reducing this information gap. We study some key institutional aspects of 
traditional regulated markets and their effects. In particular, we focus on the central role 
played by state regulated commission agents, so-called ―brokers‖: agents who are widely 
present in Indian markets to assist sellers in finding buyers through the organization of 
auctions. It is mandatory for buyers and sellers of food to work through brokers, whose 
activities are licensed, and whose fees are fixed, all as part of the extensive government 
regulation of market transactions.  
In this paper, we use micro-economic evidence to analyze the functioning of these 
agents in their regulated environments. Based on primary data from wholesale markets in the 
northern state of Uttarakhand, we look specifically at the important role of the broker in 
horticultural market transactions. The contributions of our research are twofold. First, we rely 
on a unique survey design. We collected data from farmers, i.e. the sellers, and retailers, i.e. 
the buyers, that just completed a transaction on the wholesale market. Through their answers, 
we are able to piece together information on effective practices of brokers, beyond 
information they revealed themselves. The results show that regulations on prices and 
prescribed commission rates charged by brokers in these markets are largely ineffective. This 
is an important finding as there is an active debate in the country where some people argue 
for the importance of further regulation of wholesale markets (e.g. Shiva, 2007; 
Gopalakrishnan and Sreenivasa, 2009). These proponents assume that the regulations deliver 
in practice what they state to deliver in theory. 
Second, as we did not only collect information on broker practices in agricultural 
output markets but also on markets for credit and insurance, we are able to link broker 
activities to services delivered in these interlinked markets. There is a vast literature on 
interlinking and it has been argued that such interlinkage often leads to exploitation of 
farmers (e.g. Crow and Murshid, 1994; Basu, 1986; Bell, 1988). We find, consistent with the 
previous literature on interlinkages (Bell, 1988; Basu, 1986), that brokers subsidize interest 
rates on advances but in contrast with this literature, we do not find that this leads to lower 
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implicit output prices. Brokers thus seem to use these interlinkages as to tie the output of the 
farmers to them and they seem to have enough rents under the existing regulated market 
system to pay for the costs of the financial services they provide.    
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives background information on the 
functioning of agricultural markets in India. In Section 3, our data and methodology are 
presented. In Section 4, we discuss some descriptive statistics on the nature of transactions on 
these wholesale markets. Section 5 looks into the effects of market regulations. Section 6 
studies the role of relationships and market interlinkages. We finish with the conclusions and 
implications in Section 7. 
 
2. Wholesale markets, brokers and regulations in India 
Government intervention in agricultural markets has been pervasive since India‘s 
independence in 1947, with the initial objective of improving the efficiency of markets, 
ensuring remunerative prices for producers as well as affordable prices for consumers 
(Mehta, 2006: 146; World Bank, 2007). At that time, agricultural marketing was perceived to 
be badly organized, leading to low prices for the producer, large physical losses, and high 
marketing costs. A large number of regulations were thus put in place—including controls on 
private storage, transport, processing, exports, imports, credit access, and market 
infrastructure development, as well as a small-scale reservation policy for selected industrial 
sectors.  
One of the main interventions by the government was to establish a large number of 
public market yards for the wholesale of agricultural products and to regulate these markets 
through an Agricultural Produce Marketing (APM) Act (Acharya, 2004).
3
 Wholesale markets 
(mandis) numbered 268 at Independence. It is estimated that there were around 6,300 
wholesale markets in India in 2007 (Chauhan, 2008). Agricultural marketing within a 
particular state is regulated by the local Agricultural Produce Marketing (APM) Act but 
variation exists between the states in terms of the extent to which the act is implemented. If it 
is implemented, an Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) is responsible for 
enforcing the act for each market area. The APMC is empowered to establish markets, 
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 The wholesale market (mandi) premises are known as the ―market yard‖. This must be distinguished from the 
―mandi area‖, which is the entire territory under the purview of a particular mandi. This means e.g. that all the 
mandi tax chargeable to the agricultural output produced in the area must be paid to that particular mandi, even 
if it is not physically traded within its premises. 
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control and regulate the admission of traders to the market, charge fees (market, license, and 
rental fees), issue and renew licenses, and suspend or cancel licenses. It allots shops to agents 
who meet basic eligibility criteria (based on nationality, solvency, and other not particularly 
restrictive criteria) upon payment of a (rather small) license fee.
4
 Once awarded, licenses can 
be renewed annually.  
The salient feature of a typical (non-amended) APM Act is that all ―notified‖ 
agricultural commodities grown in the ―notified‖ area of the market (encompassing its legally 
defined primary catchment area) are required by law to be sold only on these markets, and 
exclusively through government-licensed traders or brokers, usually through auctions.
5
 In 
other words, in the traditional APM Act, there are no provisions for direct procurement from 
the farmers‘ fields, nor for contract farming. There are clear upper bounds to the commission 
rates brokers are allowed to charge; and brokers must pay taxes to the mandi authorities as a 
contribution to a marketing development fund. This fund should be used for e.g. developing 
infrastructure at wholesale markets and their ―notified‖ area.   
Typically, farmers bring their produce to the wholesale market and to the shop of the 
broker with whom they would like to work. Buyers—mostly retailers—then pick up the 
produce from there. Transactions take place mostly by means of an open-outcry auction, 
managed by a broker who does not take possession but rather just takes commission 
(therefore called a ―commission agent‖).6 As lots are auctioned, new prices are set. Sub-
wholesalers, who buy on the wholesale markets but do not sell to consumers themselves, or 
(petty) retailers, who do sell directly to consumers, buy produce on these wholesale markets. 
The latter then distribute these products by pushcarts, in mom-and-pop stores, or at wet 
markets to urban consumers (see also Minten et al., 2010). 
Under the APMC marketing system, it seems that the bulk of trade in agricultural 
commodities takes place at the wholesale market, run and operated by the APMC. While 
farmers might have the option—depending on state regulations and on the enforcement of 
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 The procedures for licensing are the following: Commission agents pay every year 250 Rs for their license, 
plus 1 Rs ―form fee‖. This seems to be a nominal amount. These licenses can be renewed on a yearly (or a 5-
year) basis and it happens very rarely that licenses are not being renewed (but they can be transferred to other 
family members). There is no restriction on the total number of licenses that can be given out. Every year there 
are new applications for as well as issues of licenses. So, there are seemingly few barriers to entry. 
5
 The number of notified commodities varies by state and market location, but in general all major food 
commodities are included. 
6
 Unfortunately, no statistics exist on either their geographic coverage or the percentage of crops they handle 
compared to the trader who takes possession. 
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these regulations—to go through local village traders,7 Fafchamps et al. (2008) find that the 
majority of non-staple foods is sold directly through brokers on the wholesale markets by the 
rural producers themselves.  
It has been acknowledged in the literature that these regulated markets have served 
farmers well over time, by offering an assured market and reducing exploitation by 
unscrupulous traders (Kahlon and George, 1985:26), that these markets have successfully 
become a nodal point in agricultural marketing in India as the majority of marketed produce 
passes through it (Fafchamps et al., 2007), and that they have created growth centers 
influencing employment, industries and land use in their proximity (Harris, 1974). However, 
the regulated market system has come under increased criticism over the years.  
One reason is the perception of low prices received by farmers compared to consumer 
prices (e.g. Prashant, 2010), which may be partly attributable to collusion by brokers and the 
perceived lack of other sales outlets for small farmers (Goyal, 2010). This basically stems 
from the fact that the APM Act prohibits farmers from selling outside the market yard. While 
in theory there is no limit on the number of licenses issued by the APMC, the number of 
license holders typically greatly exceeds the number of shops available in the market yard. 
Legally, license holders have equal right to conduct business, but in practice the lack of space 
for trading often severely curtails their business. Since the number of physical shops is 
practically fixed and holders rarely return licenses, the advantage enjoyed by license holders 
who have secured a shop at a given rate generally only reinforced over time. Invariably, 
members of the same family conduct business at the same shop, which is passed on from one 
generation to the next.  
A second factor putting pressure on traditional market regulations is the increased 
demand for food safety and quality driven by strong income growth and development. 
Effective quality management requires the establishment of closer relationships between 
upstream and downstream agents, leading to increased vertical coordination in modern supply 
chains (Swinnen, 2007). As APMCs have emerged over time as a government-sponsored 
marketing-services monopoly that prohibits innovations such as contract farming and the 
direct procurement of large corporate bodies (Acharya, 2004), in many states closer vertical 
coordination in agricultural supply chains is ruled out by law.  
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 These village traders may be either independent or work for specific brokers in the wholesale markets. 
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A third problem is the increased importance of bureaucrats in the management of the 
APMCs: although more than half the members of this committee were representing the 
farmers of the market area at the start of the regulated market system, elections have not been 
held regularly, and committees are now often administered by bureaucrats, possibly stifling 
private sector investments (Acharya, 2004). 
Further problematic aspects include the large area served per market yard, the creation 
of barriers to entry for newcomers, and the overreliance on market fees as a source of income 
for the government (Archarya, 2004). While the APMC collects significant revenues from 
market fees, the infrastructure in most markets is largely deficient, as revenues are often 
directed towards other ends by the government (Umali-Deininger and Sur, 2007; Fafchamps 
et al., 2008). As a result, the majority of wholesale markets are not paved, and there are few 
grading or cold storage facilities. Sanitation facilities are largely deficient, with few public 
toilets, inadequate drainage, and little or no coordinated pest control.
8
 As can be expected, 
postharvest losses are rather large in this trading environment. 
Given these perceived problems with the existing regulated agricultural market 
system as well as the eagerness to seize new opportunities for agricultural development, the 
central government, in consultation with state governments and the private sector, formulated 
a Model Amended Act, which was circulated to the states in 2003. The Model Amended Act 
proposed the removal of restrictions on farmer direct marketing, the opening of market 
infrastructure development to other agencies (especially the private sector), and the 
establishment of a framework to support contract farming. Indian states have responded 
differently to the Central Government‘s initiative. By early 2007, 11 of the 28 states in India 
had amended their APM Act but 14 had not, while 2 had never had the original act in place 
and 1 (Bihar) repealed the act (Chauhan, 2008). 
 
3. Data and methodology 
To better understand the activities on traditional regulated wholesale markets for horticultural 
products, a survey was conducted in Uttarakhand, a state in the North of India.
9
 There are 17 
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 To understand why this is important, see e.g. Shilpi and Umali-Deininger (2008) for empirical evidence on the 
benefits of market infrastructure for agricultural trading in Tamil Nadu. 
9
 Uttarakhand was established as an independent state as recently as in 2000. Uttarakhand‘s population is 
estimated at 8,489,000 (Census of India, 2001), of which 74% lives in rural areas. It is estimated that 90% of the 
population depends on agriculture for its living (Government of India, 2010). Major agricultural crops include 
rice, potato, wheat, peas, litchi, apple, green gram, and medicinal plants (Government of India, 2004).  
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wholesale markets in Uttarakhand, out of which 16 are regulated under the APM Act and 
only 1 is non-regulated. While a draft bill on the amendment of the APM Act in the state was 
in circulation at the time of the survey (and had been for a number of years), it had however 
not yet been voted on by the Uttarakhand Assembly. The survey was conducted in December 
2007 on the two major wholesale markets of Uttarakhand, the wholesale market of Dehradun 
(Niranganpur) and the wholesale market of Haldwani (Naveen Mandi Sthal). According to 
the Government of India (2004), the main crops arriving to the Dehradun wholesale market 
are potatoes, green peas, ginger, and litchi. The main crops arriving to the Haldwani 
wholesale market are potatoes, tomatoes, wheat, and rice. In the year 2007, the Dehradun 
market had 13 category A broker shops, 34 shops of category B, 78 of category C, 56 of 
category D, 10 of category E and a small number of brokers operating out of tin sheds.
10
 The 
Haldwani market had about 230 shops of categories A, B and C, and another 20 or so brokers 
operating out of tin sheds. Brokers pay a low yearly license fee of 250 Rs (around 6 USD). 
They may as well apply for a 5-year license. 
Our survey focuses on the vegetables cauliflower and green peas. These were the two 
vegetables that were in full harvesting season and in plentiful supply at both wholesale 
markets under consideration during the weeks in which our survey was conducted. They are 
both produced locally and both crops are characterized by significant seasonality. For 
instance, mandi records on the year preceding the survey show that average prices in the 
period December-March were only one-third the level of the lean period (June until 
September). Supplies on wholesale markets show even larger swings over the year. The 
Indian government does not directly intervene in the procurement or price setting of 
horticultural crops.  
Our preliminary interviews and data collection revealed that there were major 
discrepancies between information on transactions collected directly from brokers and the 
agents they interacted with. It became clear that because of existing regulations, brokers had 
strong incentives to misrepresent information on transactions. Hence, one could not rely on 
interviews with brokers as reliable sources of information. It was thus decided to interview 
farmers and petty retailers (the major buyers on these markets) that just completed a 
transaction on the wholesale market and to piece together the functioning of brokers based on 
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 These shop categories are based on size (and correlated with the brokers‘ sales volume); the yearly shop rent 
is fixed per category. 
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farmer and retailer interviews. We did not find incentives for these agents to systematically 
bias information, in contrast with brokers. Hence, we believe that we obtained a more truthful 
picture this way.  
A total of 480 questionnaires were completed of which 240 in Haldwani and 240 in 
Dehradun. The study was set up in such a way that half of the surveys were conducted with 
farmers and half of them with retailers and that half of the agents were involved in green peas 
and half of them in cauliflower. Farmers and retailers were both randomly selected. Farmers 
were interviewed on the wholesale market, right after selling their produce, while retailers 
were interviewed at the major retail markets of the city.
11
 Enumerators were explicitly asked 
to behave in a discrete way, as to avoid being obstructed by suspicious brokers.  
The survey contained detailed questions on the demographic background of the 
interviewees, the reasons for the choice of the marketing channel and the broker, and on 
linkages with the broker used in the last transaction of cauliflower or green peas. Then, 
information was asked on the last completed transaction, including detailed and 
disaggregated information on prices and costs, observable quality characteristics of the 
product, quality and quantity assessments by retailers, and the costs incurred in the last 
transaction. The survey finished with questions on wholesale market practices in general.  
We start with descriptive statistics on the farmers and retailers who participated in the 
survey (Table 1). There is little difference with respect to demographics between farmers and 
retailers. While farmers are slightly older (47 years versus 37 years for retailers), the level of 
education and the size of the households are similar. About 40% of them are member of a 
disadvantaged group under the Indian system, i.e. a scheduled caste, tribe, or other backward 
caste. 29% of the farmers carry a BPL (Below the Poverty Line) and 65% an APL (Above the 
Poverty Line) card.
12
 This compares to 30% and 51% respectively for retailers. On the other 
hand, while 47% of the farmers own a mobile phone, only 25% of the retailers have one.  
Apart from green peas and cauliflower, the majority of farmers and retailers also sell 
other agricultural products. 83% of the farmers sold other products over the year and 85% of 
the retailers sold another product over the last two weeks. The two products are however of 
                                                 
11
 This was considered to be the optimal way to get as reliable as possible information from both groups of 
respondents. Retailers, who would visit the wholesale markets in the morning, were often under time pressure to 
leave the wholesale markets and start their retail activities. In the afternoon, they typically had more time 
available. 
12
 Both BPL and APL cards are distributed to poorer households by the government as to allow them cheaper 
access to basic necessities.  
9 
 
major importance for these agents. They make up 75% of the annual monetary income of 
farmers and represent 41% of the turnover of retailers over the last two weeks. Both have 
similar years of experience in dealing with the product under study. As could be expected, 
farmers and retailers differ in the frequency of market visits. Retailers visit almost every day 
while farmers come on average 23 times a year. Few farmers (16%) and retailers (2%) visit 
other markets. 
 
4. The nature of transacting  
We distinguish four operations in an agricultural marketing transaction on the wholesale 
market: physical handling, quality assessments, quantity assessments, and financial 
settlements. They are discussed consecutively. 
 
(a) Physical handling 
The farmers face physical handling and transaction costs in the process of selling their 
produce to the wholesale market. First, farmers transport their produce to the market and bear 
the costs for this. The large majority of farmers (94%) use motorized transport to do so. Little 
aggregation and pooling takes place at the village level as 62% of the farmers only bring 
produce of themselves when they travel to the market. Except for those farmers who own 
their own means of transport, transport usually has to be paid for and amounts, on average, to 
almost 10% of the price that is fetched on the wholesale market. Second, farmers face 
opportunity costs for this physical handling process as well as for assisting at the auction. The 
average farmer spends almost two hours to travel to the market and another two hours to go 
back as well as 3.5 hours on the wholesale market itself.
13
 In total, an average farmer reports 
to spend 7.5 hours to conduct an agricultural transaction, which is valued on average at about 
75$.  
 
(b) Quality assessments 
The large majority of retailers believe there are quality differences between the different lots 
of agricultural produce at the wholesale market (Table 2). To assess the quality, retailers rely 
mostly (85%) on personal inspection. 10% of the retailers report to trust the broker in offering 
                                                 
13
 Some of the time spent on the market might not be used towards transactions but more towards social 
interactions that might not be of direct use for the transactions.  
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quality; the remaining 5% claim to have no assurance on the quality on offer. In case of 
personal inspection, quality was checked mostly by looking at and touching the produce. One 
third of the retailers reported to even have tasted the produce. While only part of the produce 
could be checked in most transactions, almost all retailers believed that the checked sample 
was representative. 
While modern markets and especially international markets put a high premium on 
food safety, this seems to be less the case in these traditional horticultural markets. The use of 
modern inputs is high in horticultural production in India but the current marketing system 
does not allow for transmission of information on the use of inputs (Fafchamps et al., 2008) – 
even if there might be important public health issues related to the lack of proper attention 
and effective food safety standards (Umali-Deininger and Sur, 2007).
14
 In our sample, only 
one fifth of the retailers stated that they were aware of the farmers‘ cropping practices and 
use of pesticide, fertilizer, and irrigation water. However, even if retailers are aware, this does 
not preclude the sales of unsafe food. Recent research in India shows that in traditional 
markets there is no price premium attached to these unobservable quality characteristics 
(Fafchamps et al., 2008).  
 
(c) Quantity assessments 
80% of the farmers and 73% of the retailers say that they know the exact weight of the lot, as 
the produce they are selling or buying has been weighed in front of them (Table 2). Weighing 
methods are mostly old-fashioned as only for about one-third of the weighing transactions an 
electronic scale is used. When lots are weighed, in many cases weights are rounded to the 
nearest kg. This practice is mentioned by 88% of the farmers and 86% of the retailers. The 
advantage from rounding off weights is in most cases towards the broker or the retailer.  
The lots that are auctioned might contain waste, such as rotten produce or foreign 
matter. For the retailers to correctly valuate lots before doing a bid, they should be well-
informed on wastage levels. If not, retailers might charge uncertainty premiums that are 
passed through to the farmers. About one third of the retailers state they do not know very 
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 For example, Marshall et al. (2003) tested fresh vegetables in different production sites and in the main 
wholesale market in Delhi. They found that 72% of the spinach samples exceeded the Indian Maximum Residue 
Levels (MRL) and 100% exceeded the Codex MRL level. Kumari et al. (2004) found that 26% of their samples 
of seasonal vegetables contained residues above the MRL levels. 
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well the level of wastage of the lot that they will purchase. 9% says that they do know it 
exactly while the majority (57%) claims to know it approximately (Table 2).  
Overall, the large majority (78%) of the retailers reports to be satisfied with the 
quantity assessment. However, there is still some dissatisfaction with the existing system as 
illustrated by the asymmetric responses by farmers and retailers towards rewards and 
payments for quality and quantity. About two-thirds of the farmers believe that they 
sometimes deliver higher quality and quantity than they are paid for while one quarter or less 
believes that they deliver lower quality and quantity than paid for (Table 2). The complaints 
are similar, but in the opposite direction, for retailers. 
 
(d) Financial settlements 
Payments for the transactions are in most cases immediate and in cash for farmers as well as 
for retailers. 82% of the interviewed farmers state that they are paid within three hours after 
the transaction. The large majority of retailers also report to pay immediately for the 
transaction. Agricultural trading is largely a cash economy as almost none of the transactions 
are settled by check or other more sophisticated means of payment. Similar results on the 
importance of unsophisticated and cash transactions have also been found in other developing 
agricultural economies (Fafchamps, 2004; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; McMillan, 2002).  
In summary, it seems that most transactions on these wholesale markets are small 
cash-and-carry transactions with significant transaction costs, as physical handling, quality 
and quantity assessments, and financial settlements are all combined in a single transaction. 
Fafchamps and Minten (1999) argue that this is usually not an efficient way of conducting 
trade given that search costs are significantly higher than they should be and large amounts of 
cash circulate in the countryside, creating problems of insecurity as well as of an inflation 
tax. Along the same lines, Reardon et al. (2003) argue that the separation of the different 
processes of physical handling, quality and quantity assessments, and financial settlements in 
developing countries‘ agricultural markets would often be paramount to achieve greater 
efficiency through economies of scale.
15
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 For example, the large horticulture cooperative Safal has about 300 retail booths in New Delhi and a 
procurement system which has served as a model for different modern retailers in India. It organizes 
procurement through collection centers in the village, outsources transportation services, relies on farmers‘ 
associations to assess quality and quantity and pays through bank wires.    
12 
 
5. The effect of regulations 
An important regulation of the Agricultural Produce Marketing (APM) Act in vogue 
in Uttarakhand states that the broker rates should not be higher than 3% and that 2.5% tax on 
each transaction is to be paid by the broker to the market officials. Both these charges are 
stated not to be paid by the farmer. We test with the data that were collected from farmers 
and retailers to what extent these regulations are respected. Figures 1 and 2 show the net 
prices that farmers received and that retailers paid for the two products under study.
16
 First, 
they illustrate the large price variation for these products over the time of the survey, often 
due to location, quality differences, and the day of the transaction. Second, they show the 
clear parallel leftward shift of the net price received by the farmer compared to the price paid 
by the retailer, reflecting the wholesale market costs and rents. 
These figures, of course, are merely suggestive. To get a more accurate estimate of 
these costs, we should control for several factors that might influence prices (P) faced by 
different agents (farmers versus retailers) in the market. To do so, we estimate two empirical 
models. First, we run a parsimonious specification:  
log(P) = α0 + α1 L + α2 A  + ε 
where L is defined as the wholesale market location, A is a dummy taking the value 1 
for retailers, and ε is the error term. We then add in a second specification additional controls 
such as quality characteristics of the product (Qk) and the time of sales (Sl):  
log(P) = α0 + α1 L + α2 A + Σkk α3k Qk + Σl α4l Sl + ε 
For both specifications, we test the hypothesis H0: the size of the margin measured by 
α2 > 5.5. A rejection of this hypothesis would indicate that the marketing regulations are not 
respected. It is important to note that, due to the specific organization of transactions at the 
wholesale market, we were not able to establish exact matches between farmers and retailers 
for the same lot being transacted. However, because of our specific sample set-up and the 
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 Small business owners often over-report expenses and underreport revenues. We have tried to minimize this 
bias by surveying farmers and retailers right after their last transaction; and we have tried to be as specific as 
possible in formulating our questions. All this information was used to calculate ‗net‘ prices, defined as the total 
amount that farmers would take home and that the retailer would have paid after leaving the mandi. We have 
asked the exact volume transacted, the gross value (farmers could choose whether to specify this for total 
volume, per bag of produce, or per kg of produce), and all the costs faced (disaggregated) at the mandi. The 
transportation costs were asked for separately as a cost not faced on the mandi (and not integrated in the ‗net‘ 
price calculations). In the majority of cases, retailers did not face transportation costs as they typically would 
come to the wholesale markets with their own pushcart early in the morning, fill up the cart with merchandise, 
and then take it to the area where they would sell the produce. Enumerators were trained for several days to 
make sure that the concept of ‗net‘ and ‗gross‘ were well understood and implemented. 
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collection of relevant controls, we believe that the estimated regression model does capture 
the appropriate aggregate margin averaged over the period of our survey.  
The results of the parsimonious regressions are shown in Table 3 (Model 1). They 
indicate that the (net) price paid by retailers is significantly higher than the (net) price 
received by farmers for both cauliflower and green peas. The difference is as high as 13% in 
the case of green peas and 26% in the case of cauliflower. As price differences could be 
caused by other factors such as the quality of the product as well as the day of the transaction, 
we next add these additional controls in the second specification of the regression (Table 3, 
Model 2). The coefficients stay largely significant and the size of the coefficient is robust.  
The estimated price gap between farmers and retailers is significantly higher (as 
confirmed by the F-statistic reported at the bottom of Table 3) than the 5.5% (3% commission 
rate and 2.5% tax) which one would expect it to be if the wholesale market worked as 
prescribed by the regulations. As we interviewed only farmers and retailers that had a 
transaction on the wholesale market, the results thus support the view that marketing 
regulations on margins are not respected.  
The difference that we find even exceeds the gap that was predicted by key informant 
interviews. One of the key informants that we talked to at the Dehradun horticultural mandi 
claimed there is a general agreement amongst brokers of his union to charge 6% commission 
to sellers (farmers) and 6% to buyers (retailers), including mandi taxes. The corresponding 
agreement in Haldwani was to charge 8% commission to farmers. Such agreements were 
clearly in violation of APMC rules. We also interviewed several APMC officials as to hear 
their side of the story. After some probing, APMC officials admitted that brokers were 
charging rates beyond legal limits; and that brokers would underdeclare their effective 
turnover in order to avoid taxes. However, not much seemed to be done about this as the 
lobby of brokers was said to have powerful connections with the government and that brokers 
were reported to fund electoral campaigns. Obviously, these latter statements were difficult to 
verify in practice. 
 
6. Relationships with brokers and market interlinkages 
6.1. The type of relationships with brokers 
While there are only a few marketing options for the surveyed farmers and retailers outside 
the broker channel (partly due to market regulations), there seems to be a large set of options 
within this channel. Farmers state they can choose among 60 brokers dealing in the produce 
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they are selling. Of these brokers, they state to know five personally. However, in practice 
farmers only use a limited number of brokers for their transactions, i.e. less than 2 on average 
(Table 4). 57% of the farmers only used one broker for all their transactions of a particular 
product last year (on average 26 transactions in total). A significant number of farmers thus 
self-select in a specific broker relationship. Often they have a long-term relationship with this 
broker as they report to have dealt with the broker of the last transaction on average for 
almost 10 years.
17
 This suggests that traditional Indian wholesale markets have not yet moved 
from the traditional type of market exchange, which is personalized and relationship-based, to 
the modern type of market exchange which is rules-based and anonymous (North, 1990:83).  
An obvious question is then why these farmers self-select into long-term 
relationships. Different reasons have been given in the literature on the benefits of 
―cooperative relationships‖ in this type of trading environment (e.g. Kranton, 1996; 
Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; 2002). They include among others information sharing, 
regularity of supply and demand, access to credit, prevention of contractual breach, and risk 
sharing.  
In earlier (e.g. Bell, 1990) as well as in more recent literature (e.g. Reardon et al., 
2008) on Indian agricultural markets, it has been suggested that financial interlinkages 
between farmers and brokers on traditional markets have been a major reason for resilience of 
traditional markets and the perceived difficulty of modern channels to compete with 
traditional ones. In this literature, it is argued that long-term relationships with brokers are 
especially valuable for access to credit and insurance.  
Access to seasonal credit for agricultural producers is often problematic for the 
poorest farmers all over the developing world, mostly due to seasonal liquidity constraints 
(Dercon and Christiaensen, 2007). Furthermore, a common problem for rural agricultural 
economies is the prevalence of different types of shocks for which especially poorer 
households might be ill-prepared. Given the lack of formal insurance mechanisms, 
households must often rely on social capital and sales of assets to deal with shocks and only 
those households that have access to informal insurance mechanisms are able to successfully 
smooth their consumption (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Hence, if there are important 
imperfections in rural credit and insurance markets, the opportunity to establish market 
                                                 
17
 Retailers report a similar large number of brokers to choose from but they usually consider a larger number 
than farmers that they effectively use for transactions. 
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interlinkages seems to be a plausible reason for establishing personalized relationships with 
brokers – as it gives farmers (and possibly petty retailers) access to informal credit and 
insurance markets. 
While there is ample evidence in the academic literature on the existence of these 
interlinkages (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Bell et al., 1997), it is less clear which role they play 
in the establishment of long-term relationships with brokers. This is one aspect we will 
document in this section. Moreover, there has been a lot of interest in the literature with 
respect to the nature of these interlinkages. In particular, it has often been argued that such 
interlinkage might lead to exploitation of farmers (e.g. Crow and Murshid, 1994; Basu, 1986; 
Bell, 1988).
18
 To further complement the existing literature, which mostly focuses on 
interlinkages between farmers and brokers, we also investigate whether there are similar links 
between petty retailers and brokers. 
Our data show that some farmers –– and a limited number of retailers – indeed use the 
broker as a source of credit and/or insurance (Table 5). 39% of the farmers report that in case 
of need, the broker would grant them a loan ―for sure‖. 18% of the farmers think that he 
would ―probably‖ do so. While more than half of the farmers think that they could rely on the 
broker in case of need, only 22% of the farmers have ever received a loan from the broker 
they dealt with in the last transaction. 20% of the farmers received a loan in the last 5 years.
19
 
However, farmers seldom rely exclusively on brokers for access to credit as 96% of the 
farmers report to have alternative sources of credit. These include formal banks (for 46% of 
the farmers) but more importantly friends and family (78%). In addition, 21% of the farmers 
received this year an input advance from the broker they dealt with in the last transaction. For 
half of the farmers, this advance was in kind, more specifically in the form of seeds.
20
 Hence, 
it seems that interlinkages are prevalent in these agricultural markets, and even if there is a 
minority of farmers effectively using them for access to credit and/or insurance, many more 
report they could use them if they wanted.
21
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 However, this does not have to be the case and they can even be beneficial as shown in other continents and 
settings by Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Gow and Swinnen, 2001; Minten et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009. 
19
 The average value of the loan was 8,263 Rs (more than 200$) or about twice to four times the value of the last 
transaction. 
20
 No fertilizer or pesticides were given in kind to any farmer in our sample. There are a few farmers receiving 
advances partly in cash and partly in kind. 
21
 This has also found by other authors. For example, Bell (1990:306) reports that: ―Traders and commission 
agents (who operate as brokers between farmers and both private traders and state purchasing agencies) are 
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Interestingly, access to credit through brokers is practically insignificant for retailers. 
Only 7% of the retailers believe that the broker would give loans ―for sure‖ in case of need 
and only 2% of the retailers report to ever have received a loan from a broker. Moreover, 
95% of the retailers claim to have other options for access to credit. Nevertheless, also 
retailers typically self-select into long-term relationships with brokers, and they do so nearly 
as much as farmers: retailers report to have transacted with the same broker for on average 
9.2 years (compared to 9.7 years for farmers). While they typically interact with a larger 
number of brokers than farmers (on average 3.5 in the last two weeks), this could be due to 
the fact that brokers are specializing in certain products, while most retailers have a large 
variety of products on offer.  
When farmers and retailers are explicitly asked why they chose the specific broker in 
their last transaction, surprisingly few respondents however list these financial services as a 
major reason. In practice, access to credit and insurance lag behind all other options given 
(Table 4). Only 26% (resp. 21%) of the farmers list the provision of input advances (resp. the 
provision of loans for other purposes) as an important reason for selecting a broker. Our 
earlier finding on the insignificance of interlinking for retailers is once again confirmed: only 
4% of the retailers would choose a particular broker because of the financial services he 
provides. Overall, it seems interlinkages are less important in explaining repeated exchange 
and personalized relationships than has been assumed in the literature.  
Sharing information also does not perform well in explaining long-term relationships 
with brokers. Wholesale horticultural transactions are spot transactions where farmers and 
retailers show up without much prior contacts. 95% and 98% of the farmers and retailers 
respectively reported that they had no contact with the broker before coming to the market. 
For those that had contact, only a limited number discussed prices with the broker. Most of 
the price information for farmers and retailers was obtained informally through personal 
observation or through contacts with fellow farmers or retailers.  
While a seemingly non-economic reason such as habit formation is part of the 
explanation of going through a specific broker (50% and 29% of farmers and retailers 
respectively state this to be very important), most farmers and retailers state that the decision 
is mostly based on a perceived reduction of search costs and on obtaining the best price 
                                                                                                                                                        
often heavily involved in financing cultivation, with the provision that their clients sell their crops to, or through 
them, respectively.‖ 
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possible. This is in line with the argument made by Fafchamps (2004) that ―repeated 
exchange can be seen as a way of economizing on the costs of establishing personal trust‖ 
and anecdotal evidence from our survey that ―new‖ farmers were charged higher commission 
rates. The importance of trust in the relationship between farmers and brokers is also 
reflected in the trust-related data coming out of our data. While only 52% of farmers reports 
to trust most mandi officials, up to 95% of the farmers in our sample report to trust most 
brokers. This corresponds to 49% and 95% for retailers, respectively. 
 
6.2. The nature of interlinkages 
Next, we turn to a more detailed description of the nature of interlinkages observed at the 
wholesale markets under study. There is a vast literature on interlinking markets. Seminal 
work by Bell (1988) and Basu (1986) indicates that a principal can extract more profit by 
interlinking markets. Typically, credit markets are interlinked with land, labour, output or 
input markets, and below-market interest rates lead to higher productivity and hence higher 
gains in the linked markets − be it the land, the labour, the output or the input market − where 
above-market rates can be charged by the lender or below-market rates paid to the borrower. 
However, it has also been argued that such interlinkage might lead to exploitation of farmers 
(e.g. Crow and Murshid, 1994; Rao and Jeromi, 2006). 
In a different strand of literature, Bardhan et al. (2009) argue that intermediary traders 
play crucial roles in marketing and financing activities all over the developing world and that 
this constitutes a source of rent creation. In their view, these ―entrepreneurial rents‖ are a 
result of their access to cheaper credit (or in our context possibly also better inputs) in a 
world with credit market imperfections, as well as of reputational advantages they may enjoy 
vis-à-vis other traders. 
To corroborate these arguments, we explore different aspects of these interlinkages 
coming out of our data. First, we analyze the determinants of market linkages. Knowledge of 
who is more likely to use these financial services (and to which extent) may already give us 
some insights in their potentially exploitative nature. In particular, rent extraction would be 
more likely to occur in case of bargaining power imbalances between the farmer and the 
broker. Viewed from this perspective, if poor farmers (who can be assumed to be more 
vulnerable) are disproportionately involved in interlinkages, this may be a reason for 
18 
 
concern.
22
 Next, we verify whether interlinkages result in high interest rates on advances as 
well as in below-market output prices. 
 
(a) Determinants of interlinkages 
To empirically explore what are the determinants that drive access to credit and input 
advances from brokers to farmers, we use a Heckman model where we estimate in a first 
stage the likelihood that a farmer was a beneficiary of a loan for personal needs in the last 
five years and of input advances in the last season, and then estimate in a second stage how 
much he received. The distance from the farmer to the wholesale market serves as an 
instrument in the selection equation.
23
 The results are shown in Table 6. 
The selection into interlinked credit relations is seemingly little linked with poverty 
levels, as poorer farmers have equal access to loans as richer ones (as measured by total land 
cultivated, by having access to a BPL card, or by being member of a scheduled or backward 
caste/tribe). Farmers that live further from the market are significantly less likely to receive a 
loan (or input advances). Using the distance to markets as instrument, the selection bias is 
reported to be insignificant by the likelihood ratio test at the bottom of Table 6. This means 
that we may as well consider the OLS estimation of the determinants of the size of the 
loans/input advances as valid (and moreover preferred to the second-stage Heckman 
regression results, as the OLS estimation is more efficient). The OLS results are thus also 
presented in Table 6. 
Farmers who cultivate more land of the vegetable under study, receive significantly 
larger loans. A doubling of the area increases the size of loans for personal needs as well as 
of input advances by around 50%. This confirms earlier results of Bell and Srinivasan (1989) 
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 As the credit use variable is a function of factors that determine both the willingness of the broker to supply 
credit and the demand for credit by the farmer, there is no clear argument on how poverty levels would 
influence credit use and the sign of its coefficient could go either way. For example, poor farmers may ask more 
(or more often) credit as they are more capital constrained while rich farmers may ask more (or more often) 
credit as they generally use more capital-intensive cultivation methods. On the supply side, rich farmers may be 
offered more (or more often) credit as they have better capacity to repay, or give a more assured return to 
investment, while poor farmers may be offered more (or more often) credit if they are seen as an easy target for 
rent extraction (which is the result that would alarm us). For a detailed discussion on credit use and the poor in 
developing countries, see e.g. Zeller and Sharma (1998). 
23
 Distance to the wholesale market should be a determinant of the costs of recuperating the money in case of 
default but conditional on receiving a loan, it can be argued that it should not affect the amount of the loan. 
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where they found credit-marketing linkages in India to be stronger in the states where larger 
farmers dominate.
24
  
These findings seem to indicate that brokers provide financial services in a rational 
way and that they do not discriminate in favor of or against the poor or specific castes. 
Brokers are more likely to provide loans or advances to those farmers whom are easier to 
monitor (as measured by travel time from the farmer‘s village to the market) and to provide 
larger loans or advances to farmers who have a larger trade volume on which the broker can 
earn his margin (as measured by the area allocated to the crop traded).  
 
(b) Interest rates 
As shown in Table 5, usually no interest rates are charged on interlinked input advances. 
While 11% of the surveyed farmers received input advances, less than one out of five are 
charged interest on these.
25
 Hence, in line with the traditional literature on interlinking (Bell, 
1988; Basu, 1986), brokers do seem to subsidize capital costs for farmers.  
 
(c) Output prices 
With our data, we do not find evidence of exploitative interlinkages as reported in other 
settings. While advances have to be paid back from sales revenues, interlinkage does not 
seem to lead to lower implicit product prices. To empirically test this hypothesis, we link the 
product prices with a dummy on the use of input advances or loans for personal needs in the 
last five years. We run an OLS regression, in which we control for the type of product and the 
quantity transacted, the day and location of trade, a range of observable quality attributes of 
the product, and a set of household characteristics which could possibly also play a role in 
price determination (for example through bargaining power). Further, given potential 
endogeneity concerns, we also run a 2SLS instrumental variable regression where we 
instrument the use of credit or input advances by the logarithm of the time needed for the 
farmer to travel to the market; and a treatment effects regression where we use travel time to 
the market, product type, market location and some household characteristics to predict 
treatment (Table 7). 
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 Crow and Murshid (1994) find in Bangladesh that social power is an important determinant of access to loans 
and that poorer households get loans but on less advantageous conditions.  
25
 Unfortunately, the corresponding figures for practiced interest rates on loans are lacking; as input advances 
loans and are of similar sizes, one could possibly expect similar patterns for these. This is left for future 
research.  
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The first stage regression of the IV estimation shows, as expected, that a further 
distance from the market is associated with lower credit or input advance use. The value of 
the F-test is significant at the 10% level but is below 10, indicating a problem of weak 
instruments. Given the presence of weak instruments, we apply the Anderson-Rubin test 
(Mikusheva and Poi, 2006). This procedure corrects the threshold value for the significance 
of the variable of interest allowing for weak instruments (Bottom Table 7).  
Controlling for endogeneity raises the coefficient on the endogenous variable, 
suggesting that our OLS estimation was underestimating the impact of receiving credit on 
producer prices. This could for example be caused by a feedback from product prices onto the 
demand for credit, in particular the fact that farmers who receive lower prices, need credit 
more often. 
All specifications (OLS, IV and Treatreg) show there is no significant negative link 
between the use of credit and prices received by the farmer, implying that there is no 
evidence that interlinkage leads to lower prices for the farmer. In fact, the reverse even seems 
to be true: from the OLS and the treatment regression it seems that market interlinkages 
coincide with better pricing conditions for farmers. The endogenous variable carries the same 
sign in the IV regression, but it is not significant due to the lower level of efficiency in the 
latter. A potential explanation rests in the fact that credit could be a proxy for trust or loyalty, 
which may have a positive impact on prices as well. If this is true, provision of financial 
services could be interpreted as a strategy for non-price competition, rather than an 
instrument for exploitation. 
Brokers thus seem to use these interlinkages to tie farmers to them and increase their 
turnover. They seem to have enough rents under the existing regulated market system to pay 
for the cost of the financial services they provide. These rents may arise from market 
regulations leading to restricted trader entry and pervasive collusion (e.g. Goyal, 2010), or 
from advantages these brokers enjoy in terms of access to credit and/or input markets - in line 
with the argument made by Bardhan et al. (2009).
26
 Another possible source of broker rents 
reported by Goyal (2010) is the informational advantage on market and price conditions 
brokers enjoy as compared to the sellers and buyers they interact with. 
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 Almost half of the farmers in our survey who received input advances in the form of seeds, reported that they 
would not be able to find the same quality of seeds themselves at the same price. On the other hand, they do not 
believe that productivity of their vegetables was higher because of the use of these inputs.  
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 To better understand these interlinkages, we further asked farmers what the broker 
would do if the farmer would not pay back the loan received. As is usually the case in this 
type of markets, a formal enforcement mechanism is little relied upon (e.g. Fafchamps and 
Minten, 2002; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Swinnen and Gow, 2001). Farmers report that 
it is very unlikely that the broker will go to the market authorities, to the police, or to court 
(see Table 5). The broker will however refuse to work with defaulting farmers in the future, 
he might inform other brokers about it, and some brokers might use peer pressure in the 
village to enforce repayment. 
 
7. Conclusions and implications 
Relying on primary micro-level data, we study the wholesale market activities of agricultural 
brokers in India. Our results show that market regulations are significantly different from 
effective practices on the wholesale markets under study. For example, most brokers charge 
rates that significantly exceed the prescribed ones. This is an important finding to feed into 
the ongoing debate on the importance of existing market regulations which seem to impede 
the development of modern market channels. For example, regulations in many states 
prohibit direct purchases from the farmer beyond the regulated market system and there are 
severe restrictions on foreign direct investment in modern retail.  
As brokers further seem to be able to capture rents under current market regulations, it 
can be expected that the removal of these regulations to allow for free entry in primary 
marketing of agricultural produce offers scope to increase competition, and, consequently, 
raise farm prices and incentives for increased productivity. One recent example of how 
increased competition in these settings can raise farm prices is shown in the case of soybean 
prices in Madhya Pradesh, which significantly increased after the introduction of internet-
based kiosks providing farmers with price information and an alternative marketing channel 
(Goyal, 2010). 
One often-heard critique on market deregulation is that it may lead to market power. 
However, it seems that given options and information, and given the often large number of 
players on food markets in Asia, the likelihood of monopsonistic or oligopolistic market 
structures arising seems to be rather low in these markets. For example, a number of studies 
have shown the competitive nature of agricultural markets in Asia when unregulated (e.g. 
Chowdhury and Haggblade, 2000; Wang et al., 2009; Barker et al., 1985; Hayami et al., 
1999). In developed countries, companies in the food sector tend to undergo a certain degree 
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of consolidation and concentration, often for efficiency reasons, which might lead to market 
structure concerns. However, it seems that India still has a long way to go to reach that stage. 
Moreover, there is a lack of convincing empirical evidence to support the argument that this 
would really hurt suppliers of agricultural products (see e.g. Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2010). 
Our results also show that some brokers tie farmers to them through linkages in credit 
and insurance markets. We find, consistent with previous literature on interlinkages (Bell, 
1988; Basu, 1986), that brokers subsidize interest rates on advances but in contrast with this 
literature, we do not find that this leads to lower implicit output prices for farmers using these 
financial services. Interlinkages do not seem to be an instrument for farmer exploitation, but 
rather a service by brokers to establish farmer loyalty and ensure future supplies. Brokers 
seem to have enough rents under the existing regulated market system − possibly because of 
their overcharging − to pay for the cost of the financial services they provide.  
It is interesting to find these linkages in traditional markets, as they seem congruent 
with the tendency towards more vertical coordination in modern supply chains, once food 
safety and quality requirements become critical benchmarks. In modern supply chains, 
companies often contract with suppliers and provide inputs, possibly on credit, as to assure 
quality. However, it seems that in traditional markets the incentive for brokers to establish 
interlinkages with farmers is different; as their objective seems to be tying the output of 
farmers to them in order to increase their turnover (Crow and Murshid, 1994; Bell and 
Srinivasan, 1989; Bell, 1990) with little regard for food safety, monitoring of production 
practices, distribution of quality inputs, or extension of improved technologies, which are 
typical for modern markets (Swinnen, 2007).  
This implies that for some of the farmers there could be both benefits and costs of 
deregulation of agricultural markets. While all would benefit from getting better prices, some 
may lose access to the benefits of interlinkages and of subsidized advances. In the case that 
input advances would still be given in a deregulated and more competitive environment, 
farmers that use them would have to pay the real costs for these, showing up in higher interest 
rates or lower implicit output prices.
27
 However, it seems that only a minority of the farmers 
would be affected by this (as in our survey, just over 20% of the farmers reported to have 
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 The spillover effects of output market liberalization on reduced access to inputs was a major issue in the 
liberalization of agriculture in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004) as well 
as in some African countries (Swinnen et al., 2011).   
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received loans or advances). The vast majority of the farmers (almost 80%) would not be 
affected by this and only benefit from the positive price effects of market deregulation. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Unit
Avg or % St. Dev. Avg or % St. Dev.
Demographics
Age years 47.2 10.4 37.3 9.8
Level of education years 5.3 4.1 4.8 3.4
Household size number 8.0 3.0 7.0 2.3
Member of scheduled or backward caste/tribe % 37 39
Wealth
Has a BPL (Below the Poverty Line) card % 29 30
Has an APL (Above the Poverty Line) card % 65 51
Own mobile phone % 47 25
Land owned begha (≈ 1/15 ha) 19.0 23.0
Own tractor % 29
Own cattle % 88
Product characteristics (cauliflower, green peas)
Average sales both products kg per day 36.2 31.7
cauliflower kg per day 28.3 16.1
green peas kg per day 44.2 40.3
Average production both products tons per season 15.4 18.1
cauliflower tons per season 25.4 18.9
green peas tons per season 5.5 10.0
Sell other products both products % yes 85
Importance in monetary income both products avg % 75.2 23.9 41.3 30.3
Experience with… both products years 12.6 10.9 11.6 8.3
Land cultivated of… both products begha (≈ 1/15 ha) 21.5 23.5
cauliflower begha (≈ 1/15 ha) 23.1 20.8
green peas begha (≈ 1/15 ha) 20.0 25.9
Marketing behavior
Distance to wholesale market km 42.1 34.8 3.5 2.1
Visits on this market visits last 2 weeks 10.0 3.4
visits this year 23.5 18.7
Time spent on the market hours 3.5 2.2 2.3 1.0
Visit of other mandi % 16 2
Source: Authors' own survey.
Farmers Retailers
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Table 2: Quality and quantity assessments 
Unit Farmers Retailers Farmers Retailers
Overall
There are quality/quantity differences between lots
A lot % 1 3 1 3
A bit % 93 92 94 90
None % 6 5 5 6
It happens that farmer/retailer receives/delivers lower quality/quantity than paid for
Regularly % 0 0 0 0
Sometimes % 25 68 19 62
Never % 74 32 80 38
It happens that farmer/retailer receives/delivers higher quality/quantity than paid for
Regularly % 5 3 5 3
Sometimes % 68 52 64 29
Never % 27 45 31 58
Last transaction
Retailer had enough information before transaction % yes 83 78
Quality assessment last transaction
The retailer checked quality himself % yes 85
If not,…
… how was quality assured?
No assurance on quality % 66
Assurance is based on trust with broker % 34
If yes, …
… way of quality checking 
by looks % 100
by touch % 62
by smell % 7
by taste % 34
… retailer was able to check whole lot % yes 34
… if only part of the lot, was it representative? % yes 90
The retailer knows about production activities
 (i.e. pesticide use, irrigation water use, etc.) % yes 22
Quantity assessment last transaction
Farmer/retailer knows exact weight of the lot % 80 73
If weighed, …
..., weighed in front of farmer/retailer? % 80 93
type of scale used is 
… mechanical % 67 73
… electronical % 33 27
rounding off weights % 88 86
rounding off weight in farmer's advantage % 16 11
rounding off weight in retailer's advantage % 84 89
If not weighed,…
…, differences between standard units?
A lot of variation % 0 8
A bit of variation % 88 83
No differences % 12 8
Retailer knows quantity of wastage at purchase
Exactly % 9
Approximately % 57
Not very well % 34
Source: Authors' own survey
Quality Quantity
30 
 
  
Table 3: Determinants of vegetable prices (dep. var. = log(price per kg))
Unit Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value
retailer 1=yes 0.26 *** 9.23 0.24 *** 8.41 0.13 *** 4.12 0.13 *** 4.40
Dehradun market 1=yes 0.28 *** 9.91 0.31 *** 8.26 -0.41 *** -13.10 -0.47 *** -15.11
medium size 1=yes -0.13 *** -3.77
small size 1=yes -0.27 *** -4.35
mixed size 1=yes -0.12 ** -2.79
number of peas per shell number -0.02 -2.08
presence of spots 1=yes 0.07 * 1.97 -0.02 -0.47
rotten material 1=yes 0.05 1.34 -0.13 *** -2.75
less bright color 1=yes 0.03 0.68 -0.10 ** -2.50
day of transaction included NO YES NO YES
intercept 1.30 *** 53.31 1.71 *** 15.78 2.35 *** 109.27 2.51 *** 24.79
Number of observations 240 239 240 236
F-statistic 92.40 18.86 87.85 69.66
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.44 0.61 0.44 0.62
F-test for price difference between farmer and retailer higher than prescribed 5.5%
F-value 53.37 *** 42.43 *** 5.48 ** 6.29 **
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Note: Significance level is expressed as *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05 and * for p<0.1
Source: Authors' own survey
Cauliflower Green peas
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
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Table 4: Frequencies of transactions and reasons for the choice of a broker
 
Unit
Avg or % St. Dev. Avg or % St. Dev.
Frequencies of transactions
Number of transactions through brokers
this season number 9.6 9.7
last year number 26.1 27.2
last two weeks number 9.0 2.7
Number of brokers used for these transactions
this season number 1.6 0.9
last year number 1.8 1.2
last two weeks number 3.5 2.6
Number of brokers used last season (farmers)/last 2 weeks (retailers)
One % 57 17
Two % 33 19
more than two % 10 64
Time dealt with the broker of last transaction years 9.7 9.1 9.2 7.1
%  that states this as a "very important" reasons for choosing the broker in the last transaction
"He finds lots of potential buyers/sellers" % 46 34
"He offers better prices" % 55 64
"He offers higher quality" % 66
"He gives seasonal input advances" % 26
"He allows me to defer payment" % 16
"He offers loans in case of need" % 21 4
"I have the habit" % 50 29
"He has quick transactions" % 63 58
Source: Authors' own survey
Farmers Retailers
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Table 5: Credit and input advances
 
Unit
Avg or % St. Dev. Avg or % St. Dev.
Access to credit/insurance (from broker in last transaction)
The broker gives loans in case of need
yes, for sure % 39 7
probably % 18 22
no % 44 71
Buyer/seller ever received a loan from this broker % 22 2
Number of loans received in the last five years
1
Number 1.9 1.1 2.4 1.7
The value of the loan - mean Rs 8263 9429 21500 38464
Buyer/seller has other sources of loans % yes 96 95
If yes, from…
...bank % 46 17
…friends/family % 78 81
…others % 2 14
Access to input advances (from broker in last transaction)
Received an input advance this season from broker in last transaction % 21
(Partly) in kind (seeds) % 12
Value of seeds received - mean Rs 6115 7769
(Partly) in cash % 12
Amount of cash received - mean Rs 6982 9546
Had to pay interest on these advances % 4
Receives advances every year % 6
What would happen if these input advances were not paid back?
2
"Broker will not work with me anymore" % yes 84
"Broker would complain to the market authorities" % yes 20
"Broker would complain to the other brokers" % yes 77
"Broker would use social pressure in the village" % yes 55
"Broker would bring me to the police or court" % yes 2
1
 for those who ever received a loan; 
2
 for those who received input advances
Farmers Retailers
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Table 7: Effect of interlinkage on prices paid to farmers (dep. var = log(price per kg))
Unit Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value
credit/input advances yes=1 0.09 *** 2.75 0.55 1.54 0.42 *** 2.67
cauliflower yes=1 -1.41 *** -5.73 -1.60 *** -3.79 -1.28 *** -5.09
Dehradun market yes=1 -0.14 *** -2.89 -0.14 ** -2.06 -0.14 ** -2.48
cauliflower
quantity sold log(kg) 0.02 0.77 0.05 1.02 0.02 0.79
medium size yes=1 0.05 0.88 0.10 1.12 0.01 0.22
small size yes=1 -0.12 -1.10 -0.14 -1.04 -0.16 -1.43
mixed size yes=1 -0.14 * -1.80 -0.16 * -1.78 -0.20 ** -2.54
presence of spots yes=1 0.20 *** 2.75 0.13 1.37 0.18 *** 2.71
rotten material yes=1 0.04 0.56 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.64
less bright color yes=1 0.21 ** 2.40 0.23 ** 2.54 0.19 ** 1.96
green peas
quantity sold log(kg) -0.09 *** -2.79 -0.09 ** -2.20 -0.08 *** -2.81
number of peas per shell -0.02 -1.27 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -1.25
presence of spots yes=1 0.07 1.25 -0.04 -0.29 0.07 1.27
rotten material yes=1 -0.20 ** -2.16 -0.19 * -1.68 -0.20 ** -2.34
less bright color yes=1 0.01 0.10 -0.21 -1.02 -0.01 -0.17
Household characteristics
member of SC/ST/OBC yes=1 -0.09 ** -2.06 -0.06 -1.05 -0.09 * -1.82
years of education log(nr) 0.05 ** 2.40 0.02 0.60 0.02 0.81
holder of BPL card yes=1 0.00 0.14 -0.03 -0.47 -0.02 -0.54
day of transaction included YES YES YES
intercept 3.21 *** 16.31 3.00 *** 7.90 3.12 *** 15.70
Number of observations 239 237 237
F(26,  212) 49.91 15.52
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
Wald chi2(26) 1026.17
Prob > chi2 0.000
R-squared 0.77 0.60
Adj R-squared 0.55
AIC -2.34 270.56
BIC 91.53 395.41
For IV regression:
First-stage regression statistics F(1,215) 3.750
P-value for significance instrument: log(distance traveled) Prob>F 0.054
P-value Wu-Hausman F-test for exogeneity of end. var Prob>F 0.086
P-value Durbin-Wu-Hausman-test for exogeneity of end. var. Prob>Chi 0.069
P-value A-R test for signif. end. var. with weak instrument (cov.-corr. conf. set) 0.042
For Treatment Effects (ML) regression:
P-value Wald-test of independent equations: Prob>Chi 0.004
Note: The selection equation of the treatment regression controls for logarithm of time required to travel to market 
(which functions as the excluded instrument in the IV regression), for product and market, and for same household characteristics as above.
Note: Results for regressions (1) and (3) are robust to heteroscedasticity; Results for regression (2) are robust to weak instruments.
Significance level is expressed as *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05 and * for p<0.1.
Source: Authors' own survey
TreatregOLS IV
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Cauliflower prices 
 
Figure 2: Green pea prices 
 
Source: Authors‘ own survey. 
